Unofficial translation from the Arabic version. See original in Al Araby al Jadid
The crisis facing the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has sharpened following U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order last November designating its branches in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt as terrorist organizations. According to the White House, these groups “fuel terrorism, carry out destabilizing campaigns, and oppose U.S. interests and those of its allies in the Middle East.”
Amman, however, did not need Washington’s designation to harden its stance. The Jordanian government has been locked in a protracted tug-of-war with the Brotherhood for years. Once the regime’s favored ally during the era of martial law in the last century, the movement has since lost its privileged status. With the return of parliamentary life in 1989, the shifting landscape of cooperation and confrontation became increasingly visible—from being a key partner in Mudar Badran’s 1990 government to boycotting elections and leading broad opposition coalitions.
The Brotherhood has long felt the pressure. Its attempt to distinguish between its religious activism and its political engagement led to the establishment of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) Party in 1992. But the line between the movement and the party remained blurred, with the Brotherhood maintaining decisive influence over party structures and decision-making.
This overlap was perhaps most visible in the movement’s fraught relationship with Hamas. Jordanian security services believed Hamas exerted influence within the Brotherhood’s ranks, inevitably extending into the IAF. Until recently, the labels of “hawks” and “doves” within the movement were widely interpreted as markers of proximity to, or distance from, Hamas’s agenda and external networks. The 1999 expulsion of Hamas leaders from Jordan under Prime Minister Abdul Raouf al-Rawabdeh temporarily eased some of these tensions and signaled the state’s insistence on clear boundaries.
For decades, authorities tried to fragment the Brotherhood by co-opting influential figures and nurturing parallel Islamic entities to erode its monopoly over political Islam. These efforts failed to dislodge the group, which remained a central actor in Jordanian politics. But the Arab Spring marked a turning point: the regime concluded that the Brotherhood had sought to leverage regional upheavals to escalate its demands, posing what it viewed as a threat to the political order. That perception continues to shape policy to this day.
In July 2020, the Court of Cassation ruled the Brotherhood dissolved and illegal, upholding the registration of a rival association with the same name that severed ties with the original group. A series of legal battles over assets followed. Throughout this period, the government maintained a delicate balancing act—using the dissolved group as a lever in political bargaining while managing its influence.
The political drama deepened when the Islamic Action Front performed strongly in parliamentary elections, securing a sweeping victory on the national list with 17 seats—plus 14 seats won by allied independents—giving the party a robust 31-member bloc. The response was swift: centrist parties in parliament banded together to form an alliance designed to dilute the IAF’s influence and curb its reach in legislative decision-making.
Inside the state, concerns were growing that the Brotherhood and the IAF were gaining public sympathy amid the war of extermination in Gaza, and that their rhetoric—especially surrounding the events of October 7—was increasingly confrontational and capable of mobilizing the street in ways the state found difficult to control. Armed attacks on Israel launched from Jordanian territory were viewed as a dangerous escalation, particularly after the Islamic movement initially embraced them before walking back its position.
Tensions peaked when a high-profile State Security case accused individuals—including members of both the Brotherhood and the IAF—of manufacturing missiles and drones and engaging in recruitment activities. The case fueled renewed debate over the Brotherhood’s legitimacy. In April, the government formally banned the group, criminalizing any support for or promotion of its activities. The IAF’s status, meanwhile, remained precarious amid accusations of continued affiliation with the outlawed movement.
Trump’s executive order has now poured fuel on the fire. Some in Jordan are calling for the immediate dissolution of the IAF before Washington takes further steps, while others argue for dissolving parliament altogether and holding new elections—particularly if moves are made to exclude IAF lawmakers. Conversely, other voices warn against aligning with what they describe as the Trump administration’s “adolescent” approach to designation, recalling that groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—once branded terrorist organizations—now reportedly enjoy access to official U.S. channels.
For now, Amman is waiting for clarity. It remains uncertain whether the U.S. intends to impose sanctions on Brotherhood figures, and what information underpins its decision. Behind closed doors, officials are exploring options: Can the IAF be legally and structurally severed from the Brotherhood? Can it continue to function as a political party committed to Jordan’s reform agenda without falling afoul of Washington?
A recent study by the Institute for Policy and Society argues that the IAF’s survival under current conditions is untenable, and that it faces two paths: merging with another political party or rebranding itself entirely under a new name and identity.
Either way, the Islamic Action Front is standing on a knife’s edge. The available choices are difficult and the costs high. Yet if history offers any guide, it is that political Islam in Jordan—pragmatic, flexible, and adept at adaptation—will seek a way to survive. And no one knows this better than the Jordanian state itself.
