According to some press reports, the Ministry of Finance is in the process of preparing a third supplementary budget for 2010, to cover some arising expenditure, such as the cost of appropriating lands for the railway network project, even though this project did not receive the final go ahead.

The preliminary study prepared by BNP Paribas and others shows that the project does not deserve priority, as its feasibility is in doubt.

The issuance of supplementary budgets is not that easy anymore. Before a supplementary budget can be approved to authorise the payment of extra expenditure, it must be approved by the Parliament, which is currently swamped in tens of temporary laws and general issues.

If the main purpose of this third supplementary budget is to start funding the railway project, the project must be examined and subjected to general debate and final approval by Parliament.

To start financing the preliminary cost, exceeding JD150 million, will create a commitment to later pay several billions of dinars, which are not available.

Financing the project by borrowing will raise the country’s Treasury indebtedness to a level that is unacceptable economically, financially and politically.

The minister of transport, under whose jurisdiction the project falls, was candid enough to inform the public that the project is not feasible as far as transporting passengers is concerned. The feasibility study, in turn, stated that the project is not feasible unless it is connected to Iraq.

The Iraqi government, the study also showed, told Jordan that Iraq is not interested in extending its railway network system westwards towards Jordan and Syria. The Iraqis have a project to build their railway system eastwards, to connect with Iran.

In other words, the railway system is not needed to transport passengers and is useless if not connected to Iraq, the main importer of Jordanian products and once a major user of the Aqaba Port.

The feasibility study revealed that this mega-project will be a losing enterprise, as it needs direct cash subsidies from the government for at least 12 years after its completion. It said that BOT investors, if any, will expect the government to guarantee a net return of not less than 15 per cent a year for their investment, besides covering the operating losses.

In this respect, one wonders about the reason for the willingness and readiness of the government to appropriate private agricultural land in favour of projects like railways and/or ring roads, thus threatening what is left of arable land.

Part of these ring roads are not needed in the first place, such as the Greater Amman development ring road, which in fact has nothing to do with development, and the ring road around Irbid Governorate, the appropriated land of which cost tens of millions of dinars just to build a costly thoroughfare, unnecessary from a social or economic point of view.

All populated centres in the governorate are already connected with good roads. Irbid Governorate is heavily concentrated with population living on a relatively small area. It depends mainly on agriculture, which will be hurt by these white elephants made at the expense of privately owned agricultural land.