Articles by prominent opinion writers in the Jordanian press over the past two days have examined a range of political, economic and regional issues directly linked to the priorities facing the state and society. Their analysis has focused on the latest Cabinet reshuffle, preparations for the 2027 state budget, developments in bank credit facilities, and the regional shifts emerging from the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

In his analysis of the latest Cabinet reshuffle, writer Maher Abu Tair argues that the Prime Minister succeeded in bringing an end to nearly a year of speculation surrounding a possible government shake-up. He notes that the government adopted an unusual approach by announcing details of the reshuffle before it actually took place.

Abu Tair writes that the Prime Minister "established a new practice twice", first before the initial reshuffle, when information about its timing was released ahead of the date being discussed publicly, and again during the latest reshuffle, when the Prime Minister's Office disclosed details before the changes were formally announced. Abu Tair describes this as possibly unprecedented in the history of Jordanian governments, suggesting that the advance disclosure was intended to "cool and extinguish the appetite for reshuffles."

According to Abu Tair, the outline of the reshuffle had already been known for some time. He points to an article he published on June 11 in which he predicted that the changes would, in principle, involve only one minister, largely because of the change in the title of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, while ruling out a broader reshuffle involving a number of ministers.

He argues that the eventual changes confirmed that the plan had been determined months earlier and that the Prime Minister succeeded in implementing it "without being influenced by pressures, campaigns or political disputes in Amman."

Abu Tair also rejects interpretations suggesting that the limited nature of the reshuffle reflected opposition from higher levels of authority to a wider change, or that it indicated the government's imminent departure following the extraordinary parliamentary session. In his view, such a scenario is unlikely because the basic outline of the reshuffle had been known for months.

He characterizes the changes as largely internal arrangements, including changes in the titles of ministers Muhannad Shehadeh and Walid Al-Masri, while Minister Nidal Qatamin continued to oversee the combined portfolios of Labour and Transport. Abu Tair sees the broader message as an attempt to avoid bringing new names into the Cabinet or opening fresh political battles.

The writer also refers to a circulating account that the Prime Minister wants to become "the least reshuffling prime minister in the history of Jordanian governments", based on the belief that improving a minister's performance is preferable to removing him and that maintaining government stability is more important than constant personnel changes.

Abu Tair ultimately shifts attention away from the identities of ministers and toward what he considers the more consequential national files. He describes the reshuffle as almost "a technical internal move", while pointing to major priorities such as the National Water Carrier, the Umrah project, Social Security amendments and local administration reforms.

For Abu Tair, these issues matter far more to Jordanians than the question of who remains in government, who leaves and who may be waiting for a ministerial position. He concludes that the Prime Minister has effectively closed the reshuffle debate at a time when, in his words, the country is weighed down by "much more important priorities."

Economist Salameh Al-Dra'awi, meanwhile, places the 2027 state budget at the centre of his analysis. He calls for a shift away from treating the budget as merely a set of revenue and expenditure tables, arguing instead for "a different fiscal philosophy" based on discipline, efficiency and sound resource management.

Al-Dra'awi warns that Jordan is preparing the new budget amid complicated regional and economic conditions that make every dinar in the Treasury increasingly important. He points to higher energy costs, fluctuations in shipping and insurance prices, and the possibility of rising prices for essential commodities as potential sources of additional pressure on public finances.

He argues that these developments could increase government expenditure through higher subsidy costs and operating expenses, making "controlling public spending a national necessity, not merely a fiscal option."

Drawing on 2026 budget figures, Al-Dra'awi notes that domestic revenues stood at approximately JD10.196 billion, compared with current expenditure of JD11.456 billion and capital expenditure of JD1.600 billion, bringing total expenditure to JD13.056 billion. The deficit after grants was estimated at approximately JD2.125 billion, while the deficit before grants stood at around JD2.860 billion.

He also highlights the government's substantial subsidy bill, which reached approximately JD1.03 billion in the 2026 budget, covering areas including wheat and feed, cooking gas cylinders, the National Aid Fund, cancer treatment, municipalities, universities, student support and medical exemptions.

The figures, he argues, demonstrate that the government's fiscal room for manoeuvre is limited. Any increase in oil or global commodity prices could have a direct impact on the Treasury through higher subsidies or increased spending on essential services.

Al-Dra'awi also draws attention to government arrears and obligations, estimated at approximately JD1.4 billion, including JD448.6 million owed in the health sector, JD399.6 million in energy and JD224.6 million in water.

For Al-Dra'awi, fiscal responsibility cannot be confined to the Ministry of Finance. "Every minister manages financial allocations, and every decision he makes has a direct impact on public finances," he writes. The successful minister, therefore, is not necessarily the one who spends the entire budget allocated to his ministry, but the one who can achieve its objectives "with greater efficiency and at lower cost."

He calls for a change in administrative culture so that spending efficiency becomes a key measure of institutional performance, with projects and expenditures assessed according to their economic and social impact.

His central message for the 2027 budget is that it should represent "a genuine fiscal discipline budget", preserving financial stability while maintaining spending on essential priorities without imposing avoidable burdens on the Treasury.

He concludes with a particularly pointed formulation: "The Minister of Finance is no longer the only one responsible for public money; every minister in the government has also become a finance minister."

On the economic front, former minister and economist Dr. Mohammad Abu Hammour examines developments in bank credit facilities, describing the banking sector as a central component of the Jordanian economy, not only as a channel for savings and financing but also as a major driver of investment, productive activity and financial stability.

Abu Hammour argues that the ability of banks to direct credit toward productive sectors and projects capable of expanding and creating jobs has a direct impact on economic growth.

He considers developments in credit facilities particularly significant because they indicate the volume of financing available to individuals and economic sectors, as well as the banking system's readiness to support economic activity and investment.

According to the figures cited in his analysis, bank credit facilities reached approximately JD37 billion at the end of June 2026, representing an increase of around 4.7 percent compared with the same period last year.

Abu Hammour views this increase as an indication of continued demand for financing and a possible sign of a moderate improvement in economic activity and confidence in the banking sector, particularly amid monetary stability, moderate inflation and continued strength in financial and banking indicators.

The private sector accounted for the largest share of credit facilities, receiving approximately JD33 billion, or nearly 89 percent of the total.

But Abu Hammour argues that the size of credit is only part of the story. Its destination is equally important. A portion of lending, he notes, is concentrated in personal loans, vehicle financing, consumer goods, construction and real estate.

While these activities can stimulate domestic demand, he argues that their contribution to expanding the economy's productive capacity may be lower than that of financing directed toward manufacturing, agriculture, technology, small and medium-sized enterprises and export-oriented sectors.

The next stage, therefore, should focus on directing financing toward productive projects and sectors capable of generating added value and new employment opportunities.

Abu Hammour summarizes his argument by stating that "credit is not merely an indicator of liquidity or banks' lending capacity; it is one of the most important tools for allocating resources within the economy."

At the regional level, writer Mohammad Abu Rumman examines the broader strategic shifts that can be seen through Israel's reading of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

Abu Rumman begins with an article published by Israel Hayom by Israeli researcher Oshrit Birvadker, titled "Israel's Response to the Islamic NATO". He argues that the significance of the article lies not only in the terminology used to describe the agreement, but also in the strategic map it proposes for Israel.

He cautions against rushing to describe the agreement as an "Islamic NATO", noting that the emerging alliance remains at an early stage and has yet to be tested in a real crisis. He also points to differences in interests and perspectives among the three countries.

Nevertheless, Abu Rumman sees the agreement as evidence of a shift in the strategic thinking of the Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani leaderships and of a shared interest in building a regional framework that goes beyond formal collective defence toward strengthening their strategic position and room for manoeuvre.

For Pakistan, he sees the agreement as an opportunity to redefine its position beyond South Asia amid its longstanding rivalry with India. For Türkiye, the new arrangement fits with its stronger return to the Middle East, the growth of its defence industry and its need for new markets, partnerships and investment, alongside its historical and geopolitical interests in the region.

Saudi Arabia, however, is the most important country in understanding the timing of the agreement, according to Abu Rumman. He notes that it came amid an American-Israeli war with Iran whose repercussions remain unresolved.

He argues that the experience demonstrated to Riyadh that declaring neutrality does not necessarily shield it from the consequences of regional conflict. The Mecca agreement can therefore be read as a message to Iran that Saudi Arabia is not strategically exposed, and as a message to Israel that Riyadh does not accept a regional order reduced to an Israeli-Iranian confrontation forcing Arab states to align with one side or the other.

Abu Rumman also sees the agreement as evidence of the declining momentum behind the regional project associated with the Abraham Accords. This does not mean the existing agreements are coming to an end, he argues, but rather that the larger project of bringing Saudi Arabia into the framework and turning it into the foundation of a new regional security architecture has lost momentum.

He links this development to Saudi Arabia's position on the Palestinian issue, noting that Riyadh has tied normalization to a clear Israeli commitment toward a path leading to Palestinian statehood, while the Israeli political direction is moving in the opposite direction.

The article also highlights what Abu Rumman describes as a shift in Israel's perception of Türkiye, with the Israeli analysis increasingly approaching Ankara as a strategic threat on a level comparable to Iran.

Syria, he argues, could become the most sensitive arena in which this competition is tested, because Türkiye views Syria as a central component of its security and strategic sphere, while Israel seeks to preserve its freedom of military action and prevent the emergence of a strong centralized power there.

Abu Rumman cautions that confrontation between Türkiye and Israel is not inevitable, but says it "is no longer a remote possibility."

In his concluding assessment, Abu Rumman argues that the term "Islamic NATO" contains an element of Israeli exaggeration, but that this does not diminish the significance of the strategic shifts reflected in the agreement. The region, he writes, is entering an era defined by "flexible and overlapping alliances", with major strategic transformations underway and a new chapter taking shape in the history of the region.

Taken together, the four articles demonstrate how Jordanian opinion writers are looking beyond the immediate headlines to examine deeper political, economic and regional developments. Maher Abu Tair focuses on government stability and the significance of the limited Cabinet reshuffle, Salameh Al-Dra'awi examines the fiscal pressures facing the 2027 budget, Mohammad Abu Hammour assesses the quality and direction of bank lending and its impact on the real economy, while Mohammad Abu Rumman places the Mecca agreement within a broader process of regional strategic realignment.