The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, made significant gains in the country’s parliamentary elections of 10 September. It won 31 seats (out of 138), up from the seven seats it had in the previous parliament. While newly formed parties did not make it into parliament, others won a limited number of seats.

Nearly 1.5 million voters (31% voter turnout) cast their ballots on Tuesday to elect members of the House of Representatives. These elections were the first to be held under the new party and electoral laws that were adopted after Jordan's King Abdullah II formed a royal commission to modernize the political system in 2021. The new electoral law gave Jordanian voters two votes: One for closed nationwide party lists (41 out of 138 seats), and another for open local lists limited to the voter's place of residence.

One of the stated goals of these reforms was to broaden representation by increasing the number of political parties. Of the 38 approved parties, 25 participated in the elections, most of them formed under the new party law. However, only 10 made it into parliament.

This paper reviews the election results, places the relationship between the Islamists and the regime in its historical context, and attempts to provide a preliminary reading of what a clear victory for the Islamists means in light of the marginalized role of parliament.

The reasons behind the Islamists' win

The IAF, founded in 1992, is the largest, most organized, and most influential opposition party in the Jordanian politics. Local and regional causes and issues, especially the genocidal war in Gaza, played a major role in its recent victory.

The presence of the Islamists at the forefront of the pro-Gaza movement and the visit of its members to the house of the perpetrator of Operation Dignity on King Hussein Bridge, lorry driver Maher al-Jazi, one day before the election kick-off had an impact on Jordanian voters. The Islamists raised clear signs in their campaign, symbolizing the red triangle of Hamas, a small icon used to pinpoint Israeli targets on video coverage of the fighting. Former MP and current election winner Yanal al-Fraihat (who received 18,000 votes in Amman) designed his election boards in the form of an inverted triangle, while other candidates raised the slogan “You either vote for normalization or against normalization.”

Leaders of the Islamist movement, such as Murad al-Adaileh, the chief of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and Wael al-Saqa, the secretary-general of the IAF Party, do not deny the role of what is happening in Gaza in creating sympathy for political Islam movements. At the same time, some of these leaders are convinced that the election results are a natural consequence and a reflection of the influence of the Islamists in the Jordanian streets. The win also came in the absence of major security interventions to reduce the size of the Islamist movement in these elections.

Many Islamists and political analysts who attended the IAF winning reception believe that the Jordanian authorities deliberately kept away from the electoral process and did not “pre-engineer” it for two important reasons. The first is a message to the USA and the West in general that allowing Israel to commit violence and aggression will generate radical Islamist currents. The second reason lies in the form of the new electoral law, which reduced the ability of prior security interventions.

These are not the only reasons. Voting for Islamists is a natural consequence of the deepening crisis of trust in the government. This gap has been widening for years since Jordanians felt that successive governments failed to find adequate solutions to economic issues that impact their living standards. In addition, previous parliaments aligned themselves with government decisions and budgets that increased the rates of poverty (now at 35%) and unemployment (at 21.4%).

The Islamists also resorted to clever tactics in their local and party lists, by including candidates with tribal weight in their areas, or figures capable of attracting certain votes, such as Nasser al-Nawasrah, the former head of the Teachers' Union, under whose leadership the authorities dissolved the union and took control of its administration, prompting him to engage in sit-ins and strikes that led to his arrest a few years ago.

Al-Nawasrah's presence on the party list prompted thousands of teachers affected by the suspension and dissolution of their union to vote for the IAF party list, carrying their former captain into parliament. The number of teachers in Jordan is estimated at 137.800, which allowed the Islamists to win votes in unfamiliar constituencies such as the Bedouin district of al-Wasat.

A lack of effective parties to compete with the Islamists

Another factor that boosted the Islamists' fortunes was the weakness of the traditional parties (leftists, nationalists) as well as the new ones. Twenty-five of the 38 licensed parties, most of which were formed after the new party law, competed in the elections, but only 10 made it into parliament.

The leftist and nationalist parties, as well as the civic movement, were unable to cross the 40,000-vote election threshold due to their lack of influence on the street for ideological reasons related to the Jordanian street, such as the leftist ideology.

Political parties formed after 2021 – led by former officials such as Al Mithaq Al Watani (National Charter) Party, led by former minister Mohammed al-Momani, and Irada Party, led by former minister Nidal al-Batayneh – faced the major challenge of how to build a real popular base capable of competing against the Islamists. Despite the support they receive from the state, these parties suffer from several problems, most notably the lack of social roots and a strong popular base. In addition, they are often perceived by voters as an extension or a tool of the regime, making it difficult for them to gain the trust of voters seeking real reform, which renders dubious the entire process of political reform.

Despite the unpopularity of the new political parties, political figures and businesspersons flocked to join them, attracted by the idea that joining them as “supported” parties would guarantee access to the parliamentary. Some new parties allegedly sold the ranking of candidates on their lists for big sums of money, said to be up to $1 million. These allegations were disclosed by resigned members of the party, prompting the Independent Election Commission to refer the secretary-general of a party – without mentioning its name - to justice.

What does the election say about the evolving relationship between the regime and Islamists?

Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood sided with the regime at critical moments during the 1950s, allying with the late King Hussein bin Talal against the Nasser-backed government of Suleiman al-Nabulsi. This period witnessed a conflict between the government and the king, which escalated into coup attempts by officers in the Jordanian army in 1957. In this context, the Brotherhood played a prominent role by mobilizing the streets against the nationalist government, which was later dismissed by the king. The king then issued a decree banning all parties except the Brotherhood and declared martial law, which lasted until 1989.

With the advent of the Arab Spring uprisings, the relationship between the Jordanian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood started to change. The regime faced increasing challenges with popular demands for political and economic reforms and considered the Muslim Brotherhood to be the one leading the demonstrations that swept the country (2011-2013). After the failure of the Arab Spring, and after it turned into bloody wars in neighboring Syria, the regime began a counterattack against the Muslim Brotherhood. It continued to seek to curb the group’s influence without resorting to overt repression, as in Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, although it did arrest a number of its leaders. During that period, the regime focused on minimizing the Muslim Brotherhood’s chances of achieving a parliamentary majority that could threaten its existence. To this end, it resorted to a number of tactics, including “election engineering” – a term that appeared in the 2020 parliamentary elections, whereby candidates' papers were arranged to fit a particular outcome. Some candidates were also pressured by state security to withdraw, including through violent political harassment and detention.

Unlike the 2020 elections, the clash between Islamists and the Jordanian authorities eased in the September elections, and harassment was limited to a few instances, such as the cancellation of public halls and the arrest of the party's candidate for the Christian seat, Jihad Madanat. The authorities also arrested some party activists and candidates for distributing leaflets that criticized the official position regarding the war on Gaza. This was the case of the party’s member in Aqaba, Khaled al-Juhani, who was released after a few weeks in detention.

Islamists, led by Murad al-Adaileh, believe that there is a view among Jordanian decision-makers for the need to lift restrictions to allow for a strong parliament with a strong Islamist opposition movement to confront the Israeli far right, which may ally with the right in the USA if former President Donald Trump wins the forthcoming elections, which would revive Trump’s Deal of the Century. To ease any future tensions, Saleh al-Armouti, the former head of the Islah parliamentary bloc, sent reassuring messages to the regime that the Islamists “seek to participate, not dominate.”

Frustration with the lack of real change

Despite the cautious optimism of the Islamists, Jordanian citizens are frustrated with the lack of a real intention for change. Voter turnout is close to 31% in the 2024 elections, similar to what it was in elections held during the coronavirus pandemic. Historically, cities such as Amman and Zarqa, which are heavily populated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, have recorded lower voting rates for reasons of political representation. However, the reluctance to participate has now spread to other regions due to the deteriorating economic situation and the inability of successive parliaments to stop the government's programs with the International Monetary Fund since 1989. These programs have burdened citizens with taxes, duties, and the removal of subsidies, increased poverty and unemployment, and pushed Jordanians from villages in the north to seek to illegally migrate to the West.

This frustration stems from previous experiences with parliaments that are seen as unable to make a tangible impact on policies and legislation, as well as from a significant decline in the fundamental freedoms after the passing of the cybercrime law, which restricts freedom of opinion and expression on media and social media and was used to sentence journalists to prison terms, most notably the famous satirist Ahmad Hassan al-Zoubi.

Conclusion: Trust at stake

The form of the new parliament will be a real test of the regime's ability to rebuild bridges of trust with citizens aided perhaps by the presence of a strong parliament capable of ensuring accountability and passing legislation regardless of the political composition. Jordanians on social media networks recall a famous saying by former speaker of parliament Abdulkarim al-Daghmi, who said: “We are just decorations.” Will the next parliament erase this memory and restore trust?

The new parliament will have to effectively address a number of political and economic issues, including dealing with regional crises, such as the Palestinian cause and the situation in neighboring Syria. The previous parliament was criticized for its weak role in monitoring the government's stance on the Israeli assault on Gaza, on reviewing the peace agreement with Israel, and on normalization and the agreements stemming from it, including the gas purchase agreement.

On the economic front, the new parliament faces challenges related to the high public debt, which reached JD42.513 billion in May 2024, with the need to provide effective solutions to reduce the debt and fiscal deficit.