Iran did not choose this war; it was imposed upon it. This is a truth the Trump administration is struggling to undermine, attempting instead to replace it with a "preemptive war" narrative—claiming Washington declared war because it knew beforehand that Tehran intended to strike its "assets" and regional allies. Emerging reports show, beyond a doubt, that Netanyahu succeeded in "dragging" Trump into a war that was "unnecessary" by the standards of American interests and visions. This premise must remain present in the background of any analysis of the most dangerous escalation the region has witnessed, if only to avoid confusing "premisses" with "results" and to avoid drowning in the repercussions of the war in isolation from its instigator.

Washington in particular, and Tel Aviv to a lesser extent, wanted a "lightning war" lasting only a few days—no more than five. Tel Aviv, however, was more prepared for a war lasting weeks rather than days. The former wanted to see white flags raised over government buildings in Tehran, showing a preference for changing the regime's policies rather than the regime itself. At best, Washington wanted change to come from within the system rather than on its ruins, seeking to avoid sliding into a chaos of spawning conflicts following a messy collapse.

Tel Aviv, by contrast, is indifferent to Iran sliding into chaos or partition. In fact, it might find such a development serves its "National Security" theory, which is based on fragmenting the region and redrawing its maps along sectarian and ethnic lines. This does not include Iran alone but extends to all countries of the Levant and the once-Fertile Crescent. From the Israeli perspective, such a goal is worth fighting a war for weeks or months, especially since Washington stands ready to rescue Israel and precede it into the battlefields.

The War So Far

The war began without surprises or decisive strategic gains. While the "dual aggression" succeeded in decapitating the regime and hitting dozens of its military and security leaders—an undeniable tactical gain—it remains strategically valueless as long as the regime stays cohesive and fills its vacancies. Most importantly, its military and security arms remain capable of launching large-scale strikes in record time, not exceeding one hour. The successes boasted by Netanyahu and Trump on the first day were neither complete nor crowned by an "instrument of surrender" or a regime collapse. Meanwhile, the time factor—contrary to what is said in Tel Aviv and Washington—acts as a double-edged sword, affecting not only Iran's endurance but also the ability of the two allies, specifically the "mercurial" President, to continue a long war with mounting daily costs. Iran is fighting what it believes is the "End of All Wars," not the "Mother of All Battles," and today’s showdown is a turning point for regional history, not just Iranian history.

Most estimates now suggest we are not looking at a war of a few days, but weeks that may extend into months. This is what we heard from Trump as he denied the frustration caused by his inability to get what he wanted, and it is what has begun to creep into the rhetoric of Netanyahu and his cabinet. Iran, for its part, says the same, backed by Ali Larijani’s assertions that it has prepared for a long-term war.

Some believe a prolonged war does not work in Iran’s favor, which is true to an extent, as Washington and Tel Aviv work to raise the cost of endurance. However, it is also true that Iran is fighting with a multi-layered strategy aimed at raising the bill for the opposing side through different tools.

Before the war broke out, Tehran warned it would not stay within Iranian borders. Iran has largely succeeded in moving the sparks of war to more than eight countries in the region. There are signs of opening other fronts beyond the Lebanese front, which has ignited in an unprecedented manner, threatening a wide-scale ground war and occupation. Furthermore, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab fronts appear to be on a "hot plate," waiting for the starting signal.

Tehran has long declared that others will not be able to export their oil and gas if it cannot export its own. This is what it is doing today—not only by targeting Gulf oil facilities but by practically closing the Strait of Hormuz, even if not officially declared. We must also wait for the fate of Bab al-Mandab if Yemen enters the line of "support," this time for Iran rather than Gaza.

The "Political Economy" of the war is a card currently working in Iran’s favor. Tehran bets that Washington's friends—Arabs, Europeans, and others—will intervene to dissuade Washington from continuing, whether for security reasons (as with some Arab states) or economic ones (as with Europe, Asia, and China, the biggest loser from energy market fluctuations).

Trump and Netanyahu relied heavily on an "uprising" by the Iranian street and opposition. Trump, detached from reality, saw a few dozen celebrating the assassination of the Leader while ignoring the millions in the streets of cities large and small, demonstrating against the aggression and in defense of their country. It seems the "phone call" Trump waited for has not happened, and he will likely have to wait much longer, despite his claims that the new Iranian leadership is calling him to talk.

Arabs and Iranians: What’s Next?

Before the war, we monitored with interest the positive trends in Arab-Iranian relations since the Beijing Agreement. Some Arab states, primarily in the Gulf, had begun to reconsider Israel's position, moving it from a "potential ally" to an "existing threat," especially after the Israeli aggression on Doha targeting Hamas leaders. We saw a diligent Arab effort, led specifically by Oman, with Egypt and Qatar playing prominent roles to avert war. This encouraged us to call for a regional security and cooperation system including major Arab states, Turkey, and Iran.

Today, things are changing, especially after Iranian strikes hit sensitive sites in the heart of Gulf states, not just known US bases. Despite Iranian clarifications that they are targeting US "assets" on their lands and not the states themselves, these strikes have left deep scars in official Arab positions.

It was clear that every Iranian missile or drone hitting Israel sparked popular Arab satisfaction. Conversely, every targeting of an Arab state—regardless of the justification—revived demonization campaigns and sectarian tensions utilized by parties with no interest in Arab-Iranian rapprochement. For a "neutral" observer, striking US targets on Arab soil seems an unavoidable path for Tehran, while it remains difficult for the involved states to swallow. This leaves the question for the coming years: Why do these countries need US bases if they neither protect nor deter, but serve only as a safety net for Israel, turning from a national security asset into a burden?

Regardless of Iran's necessity or the exaggerated official Arab reactions, restoring trust and resuming reconciliation after this war will be an extremely difficult task requiring creative initiatives. This widening gap may allow Netanyahu to reconsider his "six-sided axis" to include additional Arab countries. This must be avoided at all costs; the Arab memory is still crowded with fresh images of the crimes of the neo-fascists in Tel Aviv—in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and now Iran.

Some Arab officials made a grave mistake by allowing the US to be a co-signatory on statements condemning Iranian operations in their countries. They could have acted alone; involving the US—the party that instigated the war—implies an exoneration of the arrogant perpetrator who is chasing the region's resources. It reveals a latent readiness to perhaps exonerate the second perpetrator, Israel, which is still drenched in the blood of Palestinians, Lebanese, and Iranians.

In any case, the war is still far from the finish line. It is poised to spawn further sub-conflicts and attract new parties across multiple arenas—from aerial combat and missiles to the energy market, the war of narratives, and what remains of international law.